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A new mission for Erhard Busek? 
Igor Botan, 16 February 2004  
 
 
a) Scandals avalanche  
 
Lately Moldova has been overwhelmed by scandals. They pop up regularly in 
different fields both domestically and abroad, thus shattering the myth about the 
political stability of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
As for the foreign relations, scandals pop up one after another. The incident with 
Romania has reached European level. Moldovan authorities accused Romania of 
pursuing its obscure goals when refusing to sign the Basic Treaty with the Republic of 
Moldova. Still, governmental press is committed to keep the scandal on the front 
pages, regularly featuring denigrating articles on the vices of the Romanian society 
and its political elite.  
 
However, the mere existence of a Basic Treaty does not safeguard one from scandals. 
For instance Moldova did sign a treaty with the Russian Federation, setting Russia as 
Moldova's major strategic partner. That is exactly why President Voronin asked 
President Putin to contribute towards a plan for settling Transdnistrian conflict. 
Kremlin came up with what has been known since as "Kozak Memorandum", which 
was accepted and even initialled by Moldovan authorities, and was to be signed by 
President Voronin and Transdnistrian leader, Igor Smirnov, in the Presence of 
Vladimir Putin. Surprisingly, though, Voronin refused to sign the document, thereby 
offending Putin, who had to cancel his visit in the last minute.  
 
As a result, the negotiations were disrupted and there are still no clear prospects on 
how to solve the Transdnistrian conflict. The bilateral relations between the two 
countries deteriorated to such an extent that Moldovan and Russian officials got to 
wrangle by means of press. If continued in the same manner, it may well happen that 
Moldovan diplomat Tulbure would have to deliver another annoying speech in 
Strasbourg (as he did against Romania), or we might end discovering yet another 
empire (as President Voronin discovered Romania to be), which might well prove to 
be the first and last one.  
 
Domestically, scandals also pop up regularly especially between Communists and 
media outlets not affiliated to them and between Communists and the main opposition 
parties: Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party and Moldova Noastra Alliance.  
 
Most recently President dubbed Christian-Democrats "fascist group", which "is to be 
neutralised". Surprisingly, it was also the President who several days later pointed that 
Christian-Democrats supporters only "yell and have fun", and therefore posed no 
threat to the public order. Consequently, the scandal triggered by police setting dogs 
on protesting crowd and suspension of immunity to three Christian-Democrats 
deputies, is only a prelude to other bigger scale scandals yet to come that would likely 
spill out beyond the country boundaries. This would likely determine European 
structures to inquire why Moldovan deputies' immunity had been suspended and why 
Moldovan citizens were denied the right to protest rallies. Hence, Pandora's box has 
just been opened.  
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If so, then ruling party would have to explain how comes that attacks against Chisinau 
Mayor, also leader of the Moldova Noastra Alliance, and suspension of broadcasting 
licences to municipal media outlets (Euro TV, and Antenna C radio station) were 
synchronised. In the experts' eyes of Council of Europe, OSCE and other international 
media organisations the latter is way too much for bringing the stations' activities in 
line with the newly passed legislation on municipal media. The same thing holds true 
in the case of harassing "Timpul" and "Moldovaskie Vedomosti" newspapers, 
sanctioned for alleged offences prior to a court ruling being issued and bullied with 
exorbitant fines. The thing is that, state media affiliated to the Communist Party has 
launched a campaign to lobby a referendum on ousting the incumbent mayor Serafim 
Urechean. The campaign is very much in line with the instructions given by President 
Voronin to his fellow party members during the Communist Party Plenary of last 
summer, when Moldova Noastra Alliance was declared the party's main political foe, 
with whom the party had to settle scores. In case the referendum on ousting the 
incumbent mayor really takes place, the said media outlets not affiliated with 
Communist Party could shed a different light on the event, that's why it is being 
"neutralised" now.  
 
Having said that, one may get the impression that the President, commander in chief 
of the military, General Voronin has simultaneously opened all the possible and 
impossible fronts on the political battlefield. As a strategist, he would have engaged in 
the battle only if sure of the victory on all the fronts. He should have assessed the 
terms of his victory, especially given a pre-election year, as well as the backlashes 
that have already emerged.  
 
 
b) He that sows the wind will reap the whirlwind?  
 
The latest scandals might affect the pre-election situation in the Republic of Moldova.  
Therefore, albeit Romanian and Russian officials alike keep talking of their intentions 
to keep "privileged" and "strategic partnership" relations with the Republic of 
Moldova, it is all-too-clear that they would be possible only when a new governing is 
in place. Domestic analysts expect that both Romanian and Russian elite would want 
to shape the electoral landscape of Moldova. And this firstly, because great many 
Moldovan citizens (hundred of thousands) hold also either Romanian or Russian 
citizenship. Secondly, both Romanian and Russian politicians may want to take 
President Voronin's example when during the 2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine 
he publicly stated that he supported the Communist Party in the run-up. If so, then 
President Voronin would have nothing to reproach to his Romanian and Russian 
counterparts. For instance, Romanian politicians may want to reconsider their stance 
on the visa requirements for Moldovan citizens, depending on election outcomes. This 
alone might be a strong incentive for young voters to cast their ballot. Russians may 
take a similar approach, however this time in as far as debts for gas supply are 
concerned etc. Belarus is a quite vivid illustration to this end. This would directly 
affect Communist electorate. Therefore, it would be plainly clear to Moldovan 
authorities why bilateral relations with Romania should be "privileged", whereas 
those with Russia "strategic". Moreover, it would be plainly clear to them why for a 
country as poor and disoriented as Moldova is, inadequate foreign policy might have 
disastrous effects  
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The same holds true for Transdnistrian separatist regime. There is no doubt that one 
way or another Tiraspol would get involved in the Moldovan electoral campaign if 
only to get even with Voronin and the party he is heading, for the propaganda war 
waged against Smirnov during his re-election in December 2001. The gist of Tiraspol-
led campaign is known already - since Communists got to power relations with 
Tiraspol had never been worse off.  
 
The thing is that Kozak Memorandum has triggered many other smaller-scale 
scandals that are breaching citizens' rights. Thus, to get back at Chisinau for its 
disregard of Kozak Memorandum and for the "telephonic war" it started, Tiraspol has 
resumed its propaganda war on several fronts. It intimidates the citizens by declaring 
invalid documents issued by Moldovan authorities, by closing down Romanian 
schools, and by refusing to restore telephone connection between the two sides of 
Dniester.  
 
Going back to the informational war between Communist Party and not affiliated 
media, it determined the latter to disclose some murky bargains struck by the ruling 
party, which it remains tight-lipped about. This refers in particular to the non-
transparent acquisition of luxury cars by the State Chancellery. Public opinion was 
outraged by the similar bargains struck by national railway leadership, and by the 
surreptitiously nationalised Dacia hotel, etc. All of this leaves one wondering whether 
those who are called to fight corruption, in fact are the ones to generate it. There is 
evidence to back up those assumptions, namely several scandals produced just last 
week. The first one is related to the address to the country leadership made by about 
one hundred (!) former VIPs and officers at the Ministry of Internal Affairs accusing 
incumbent Ministry leadership of incompetence and abuse that jeopardise Ministry' 
capacity to secure public order.  
 
The second one was brought about by the open letter addressed by a group of 
Chisinau Municipality prosecutors to President Voronin revealing the offences of 
Chisinau Prosecutor. What's interesting is that the letter was addressed to President 
Voronin, viewed as the last institution to appeal to in the Republic Moldova, or as 
they put it "the only person they still trust". But what about judiciary system? This is 
the more important as according to Constitution and Law on Prosecution, the 
President has nothing to do (!) with prosecution. It is the Parliament that appoints 
Prosecutor General who in his turn appoints the other prosecutors. Is that possible that 
President Voronin has suddenly become a monarch or some kind of anointed 
sovereign?  
 
The open letter is a cry of help from prosecutors, that indicates that all the legal means 
of access to the President are stymied and that the security of the prosecutors who 
signed the letter is threatened by the Municipal Prosecutor. This is a very serious 
matter that makes one wonder: who is obstructing the free flow of information to the 
head of state; what for they are doing this; what's in there for them; and finally what 
kind of state could allow for such things?  
 
Also last week public opinion was outraged yet by a third scandal - ousting apparently 
without any reason of two Deputy Ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At 
least one of them had a huge experience in the field that is quite rare for Moldova. 
The resumes of those who replaced them and of those who were recently appointed as  
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Moldovan Ambassadors to the major European capitals, paltry against the resume of 
the ousted.  
 
All the three scandals produced last week stem from the faulty policy promoted by the 
ruling party, which is based on rather teetering principles. Observers point that ruling 
party employs all the means at hand to preserve and consolidate its positions, 
including by promoting loyal people to key positions. The risk here is that upon crisis, 
the loyalty and beliefs of those people might prove to be as teetering as the very 
principles of selection.  
 
 
c) Who would fix Moldova's PR?  
 
What's striking is that the aforesaid scandals occur at the time governors claim the 
country has taken the path of European integration and is ready to comply with 
Copenhagen criteria. No less curious is the fact that what happens in Moldova brings 
to mind not EU or other candidate countries for that matter, but rather Belarus. There, 
also, important reshuffles happened last week, when President Lukashenko ousted 
almost all of the presidential apparatus as well as moguls in ministries, some of them 
even arrested.  
 
Noteworthy, last year Communist newspaper featured an article reading 
"unfortunately President Voronin is neither Fidel Castro nor Alexandr Lukasenko". 
However, now it seems the President's image veers to the very same direction the 
newspaper wished for. Therefore it comes as no surprise that Belarus President smiles 
to Moldovan citizens practically every week from the front pages of governmental 
media.  
 
Indeed authorities' actions and the scandals they brought about project a certain image 
of the Republic of Moldova, which is not exactly favourable to the strategic goal the 
country is pursuing, i.e. EU integration. Nevertheless, there is still a glimmer of hope, 
namely that Erhard Busek, Special Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe would bring a face-lift to the country image. Recently, President 
Voronin awarded him the "Order of Honour" for "promoting a favourable image of 
the Republic of Moldova on the international arena". If Erhard Busek accepts the 
honour, then he would probably feel obliged not to fall short of Moldovan authorities' 
expectations.  
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Preparations for Elections 
Igor Botan, 25 February 2004  
 
e-journal, II year, no. 25, 25 February 2004 
 
a) The quality of the electoral law  
 
Albeit there is almost one year left until electoral campaign officially starts, parties 
are already warming up. So far, possible electoral alliances and relations between 
power and opposition have been topping the agenda of the would-be electoral 
contestants. Therefore, the legal framework, which would govern the electoral 
process, has been totally neglected.  
 
For a start, one should bear in mind that the time left until next elections is not enough 
time for a cardinal revision of the electoral law. Electoral Code passed in November 
1997 and viewed by international experts as a quite good document as compared to 
other similar laws in CIS or South-Eastern Europe, does no longer meet the standards 
in as far as election administration, voting procedures, transparency of the campaign 
finance, and campaign coverage in mass media, are concerned. Just for the sake of 
comparison, in Russian Federation electoral law has been revised practically after 
each election campaign or electoral cycle, whereas in Moldova the numerous 
amendments operated to the Electoral Code resumed to clarifying existing norms, 
providing favourable playing field to the ruling parties or coalitions, and raising 
obstacles to would-be competitors. For instance, the threshold of representation for 
political parties was raised from 4% to 6%, and later it was raised for electoral blocs 
to 9% and 12%, depending on the number of parties entering the bloc.  
 
Still, in the time left until the next elections, it would be wise to bring the law in line 
with OSCE recommendations, at least. It is known for a fact that the Communist 
faction is currently working on amendments to the Electoral Code, however it remains 
tight-lipped about the articles they had set their eyes on.  
 
Secondly, after Constitution had been amended in 2000 and the country turned to a 
parliamentarian form of governing, the 5th title of the Electoral Code referring to the 
presidential elections was excluded. In September the same year, the Law on Election 
of the President of the Republic of Moldova was passed, thereby the President was 
not elected directly by people, but rather by the Parliament. The law was passed in a 
big hurry, only several months prior to the expiration of the President's mandate, and 
therefore was not well thought out.  
 
The experience of the 2001 parliamentary and then presidential elections is not 
relevant either for us to claim that such legal clashes are excluded in the future. Thus, 
last presidential elections had been firstly set for December 1, 2000 the very same day 
the four-year presidential mandate expired. Under article 78(5) of the revised 
Constitution, Parliament's failure to elect a new President after two consecutive 
attempts led to its dissolution on December 31, 2000 by the incumbent President, 
whose mandate had already expired. Although presidential seat was vacant (under 
Article 90(1), and the President was to be elected "within two months of the day the 
position became vacant". However, under Article 90(4) of the Constitution the 
President's mandate was extended for another 4 months, "until the newly elected  
 5
President is sworn in". Thus, the President was finally elected on April 4, 2001 by the 
newly elected Parliament.  
 
The aforesaid example tests the applicability of the revised Constitution and the Law 
on Election of the President of the Republic of Moldova in cases when President 
mandate and that of the Parliament expire on different terms (more than a year apart). 
In cases when both mandates expire almost at the same time, as it would be the case 
in 2005, the things wouldn't be so crystal clear, especially due to the discrepancies 
between the revised Constitution and the Law on Election of the President of the 
Republic of Moldova.  
 
 
b) Wide berth for manoeuvres  
 
To avoid possible conflicts between political forces on the eve of 2005 elections, 
certain things should be clarified right now. For a start, under the Constitution (Article 
61 (3)) and Electoral Code (Article 76), parliamentary elections are to be held within 
three months after the expiration of its mandate, whereas according to Article 2 (1) of 
the Law regulating presidential elections the President is to be elected within 45 days 
prior the expiration of his/her mandate.  
 
Constitutional Court ruling no. 31 of 10.11.1997 reads "Parliament mandate 
commences on the election day and ceases upon the expiration of 4 years". The 
incumbent Parliament was elected on February 25, 2001, therefore according to the 
Constitution and Electoral Code the next parliamentary elections should be scheduled 
for any Sunday between February 26 and May 26, 2005. On the other hand, elections 
of the President whose mandated commenced on April 7, 20001 (the day he took the 
oath) should be scheduled sometime between February 22 and April 7, 2005. Those 
dates should be reconciled so as to avoid any violation of the Constitution and laws on 
elections.  
 
Normally, given that the duration of Parliament and President mandates coincide, one 
legislature should only elect one President. If this principle is observed, then the Law 
on Election of the President of the Republic of Moldova would considerably reduce 
the 3 months period allotted by Constitution for Parliamentary elections, which would 
have to be scheduled sometime between February 27 and March 27, 2005, so that the 
new legislature would have enough time to convene (one month) and to elect the 
President by April 7, 2005 as required by law. This is the ideal scenario from a legal 
point of view.  
 
On the other hand, the said principle (one legislature elects one President) is neither 
provided for in the Constitution nor in any other law, leaving the Parliament a wide 
berth for deciding the order of electing the new Parliament and the new President.  
 
Majority faction in Parliament (including the incumbent one) or any other coalition 
not certain of its ability to secure 3/5 of the votes necessary to elect a President may 
want to exploit this, by electing the President prior to parliamentary elections. And 
they would encounter not a single obstacle in this respect. Once its mandate expires, 
Parliament may not amend Constitution nor could it amend or adopt organic laws, 
however it may pass ordinary laws and resolutions. Under the Law on the Election of  
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the President of the Republic of Moldova (Article 11) "Parliament passes a resolution 
confirming that the President of the Republic of Moldova was elected". And then, 
(according to Article 79 (1)) Constitutional Court is to validate election results.  
 
 
c) Conclusions  
 
In principle the ruling party may set the date of parliamentary elections so as to avoid 
any scandals related to parliamentary or presidential elections (from the end of 
February to March 2005) and to abide Constitution and the Law on the Election of the 
President of the Republic of Moldova.  
 
However, the experience of CIS, which Moldova is a part of, indicates that the 
temptation is too high for political leaders to take advantage of any deficiencies in the 
legislation. The most recent example is Ukraine, where Constitutional Court did find 
enough "arguments" to allow President Kucima to run for his third mandate, albeit 
Constitution clearly states that one person may exercise the function of President only 
for two mandates.  
 
Having said that, any temptations should be eliminated even if the incumbent majority 
in Parliament has given no grounds for suspecting it of ill intentions. In this respect, it 
is necessary to amend only two articles in the Law on the Election of the President of 
the Republic of Moldova.  
 
Article 2(1) of the law should be modified as follows: "Elections of the President of 
the Republic of Moldova shall be held within two months after the expiration of the 
mandate".  
 
Article 11(2) should be modified as follows: "Parliament passes an organic law to 
confirm the election of the President of the Republic of Moldova".  
Arguments:  
 
1. The deadline set forth in Article 2(1) of the Law on the Election of the 
President of the Republic of Moldova for holding elections "at least 45 days 
prior to the expiration of the mandate", was set arbitrarily. Article 78(6) of the 
Constitution provides only that "procedure of electing the President of the 
Republic of Moldova shall be outlined in an organic law". Given that the 
Constitution specifically provides that Parliament should be elected after its 
mandate expires, there is no reason why the President should be elected before 
his/her mandate expires.  
 
2. Wording proposed for Article 2(1) would be in line with Article 90 of the 
Constitution that provides that "elections of the new President shall be 
conducted according to the law within 2 months of the day the position of the 
President of the Republic of Moldova became vacant". The vacancy of the 
President position as a result of mandate expiration does not impose an interim 
function (Article 91), as is the case upon resignation, temporary impossibility 
to exercise the function, or decease. As we did point at the beginning of this 
analysis, 2001 election of the President showed that upon the vacancy of the 
position of the President as a result of mandate expiration, the President  
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"exercises his/her mandate until the newly elected President is sworn in" 
(Article 90(2)).  
 
3. The fact that election of the President should be confirmed via an organic law 
does not allow for the President to be elected by a Parliament whose mandate 
already expired.  
 8
In Favor of a Coalition Government in Moldova 
Ilian Cashu, 26 February 2004  
 
 
Hardly anyone would dispute the fact that the policies of a winning party in 
democratically held elections matter, yet more important is the style with which they 
are enforced. An authoritarian and unilateral reform style defines the majoritarian 
government formed after the accession to power of the Communist Party in February 
2001. The largest majority of changes effected by the communist majority are 
practically imposed on society in a top-down manner without any substantial 
consultations with representatives of either political parties or civil society in the 
country. As a result, this government's reforms lack consensus - a very dangerous 
practice for the health of Moldovan democracy. Moreover, a majoritarian government 
is even risky for a multiethnic Moldovan society. In contrast, a coalition government 
would force its partners to negotiate and compromise on policy proposals. Such type 
of government would offer more access opportunities to the decision-making process, 
especially to the members of the civil society. This succinct analysis highlights the 
deficiencies of the majoritarian government and stresses the appropriateness of a 
coalition government under a parliamentary regime in Moldova. Such analysis holds 
considerable practical value, notably in a situation when the results of the next 
parliamentary elections scheduled for February 2005 might dictate the formation of a 
coalition government.  
 
Although any type of government, be it majority, minority, or coalition, has its 
deficiencies, the majoritarian government run consistent with the scenario of the 
Communist Party is detrimental to Moldova's democratic future. It generates only 
arrogance towards parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary political actors; 
unilateralism and secrecy in strategic policy proposals for the country's fate; and, 
disdain for any sort of negotiations and consultations of policy reforms with the 
members of the civil society. Changes engineered by the communist majority are, 
generally, deprived of societal consensus. A regrettable practice since consensual 
reforms constitute the essence of democracies members of the European Union (EU). 
The absence of such an important democratic element in the mechanism of power 
management by the communist majority, not only dampens Moldova's EU 
membership chances, but also significantly hampers its efforts to secure an associative 
status.  
 
The luxury of having a majority allows any party irrespective of political color (be it 
communist, liberal, or social-democratic) to totally ignore the opposition, likewise 
governing unobstructed in between elections. Most notorious reforms enforced by the 
country's communist government neatly capture this practice. For instance, the return 
to the Soviet-era administrative units (raions/districts) envisaged to 'get the state 
closer to the people', only augmented the bureaucratic costs of the local public 
administration. Relatedly, the authorities rejected without any meaningful reasons all 
the criticism put forward by the civil society (e.g., social partners, think tanks), as 
well as international organizations (e.g., the World Bank). This lack of transparency 
in financing the administrative reform with public money was made possible by the 
communists' total control of the state institutions. Also, the results of the pilot project 
involving mandatory health insurance (MHI) in the district of Hancesti throughout 
2003, have not been as normally required, publicly debated. The extension of MHI  
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coverage to the rest of the country effective January 1, 2004, was not preceded by a 
sustained information campaign on the essence of reform. The absence of such a 
campaign has posed serious challenges to the successful implementation of reform, 
and may even lead to its failure. Neither did the communists take into account the 
recommendations developed by the specialized departments of the National Academy 
of Sciences when adopting the Concept of the National State Policy (CNSP) in 
December 2003. The rejection by the authorities of the civil society's proposals can 
only exacerbate and hardly solve the problems CNSP intends to tackle. Finally, the 
secrecy surrounding the drafting of the so-called 'Kozak Memorandum' (named after 
Dmitri Kozak, deputy head of the Kremlin administration, who crafted the document 
on Russia's behalf at Moldova's behest) designed to settle the Trans-Dniester conflict, 
produced fierce resistance on the part of Moldovan opposition (the swift formation of 
the Committee for the Defense of Constitution and Independence of the Republic of 
Moldova), and sustained street protests. The opposition strongly condemned the 
unilateralism of the authorities, who ultimately refused to sign Russia's conflict 
resolution plan fearing an escalation of protests within the country. These reforms 
enforced without consultations with either the political opposition or civil society are 
likely to be scratched or significantly modified by succeeding governments.  
 
Perhaps, the need for a majoritarian government based on a strong executive 
(Voronin's regime) was justified at the start of transition. Then the supporting 
institutions of the market economy had to be introduced in short time periods through 
executive decisions, without lengthy deliberations in legislative for a dominated by 
conservative forces. It was this factor coupled with a political culture based on 
unconditional loyalty to a despotic leader that facilitated the establishment of 
superpresidential regimes in Russia, Belarus, and the former-Soviet Central Asian 
republics. At the current stage of the transition process, however, the urgency nature 
of reforms has considerably diminished, in a way that makes economic and social 
reforms contingent on thorough parliamentary deliberations. More to the point, the 
political context in the ex-socialist region, including Moldova, has radically changed 
and is defined by an enhanced capacity of the civil society for producing alternative 
reform proposals. A coalition government possesses that compromise mechanism that 
facilitates the influence of civil society actors on reform process, hence effecting 
consensus-based changes.  
 
Although Moldovan communist authorities look up to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) for governing models, ordinary Moldovans, as well as many 
followers of the Communist Party, regard the achievements of the Baltic states as an 
example worth replicating. This is absolutely normal. Being parts of Soviet 
communism, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, managed, while Moldova failed, within a 
short transition period to practically secure NATO and EU membership; moreover, to 
raise the level of average pension to over $100. Neither better conditions at the 
beginning of the transition process, nor their geographic proximity to the 
Scandinavian countries, not even their relative mono-ethnic structures, are responsible 
for the comparatively successful reforms in the Baltics. The most contributing factor 
is that all the Baltic states have been ruled (and are still ruled) by coalition 
governments. This government type not only permitted key political forces to 
negotiate reform proposals within the legislative for a, but also crated an effective 
mechanism to combat corruption in state institutions. The coalition government 
constitutes the key to success of the leaders of post-communist transition, like Poland,  
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Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Only a coalition government can help Moldova 
overcome its current state of crisis.  
 
Of course, the merits of the coalition government should be viewed critically because 
Moldova has already had such an experience during the tenure in office of the 
Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (ADR) during the period of 1998-2001. Inertia 
and endless squabbles among coalition partners for high-rank positions to the 
detriment of policy priorities that sometimes characterized the ADR rule 
(unquestionably negative traits but typical of all coalition governments regardless of 
democratic consolidation), can be eliminated through a portfolio distribution pact 
signed by all parties at the start of the mandate. And this only if the lesson of ADR 
algorithm coalition is taken into consideration.. Because the ordinary citizen can 
sanction governing authorities only once in four years on an elections' day, the 
majoritarian and unchecked power powerfully corrupts! The coalition government 
contains an effective mechanism to stamp out, or at least lessen corruption through a 
reciprocal surveillance of constituent parties. Essential for the Moldovan democracy 
is the governing style based on negotiations and compromise, and hence consensual 
reforms. Moldova possesses the institutional support, i.e., parliamentary regime, and 
in case of a coalition government following February 2005 elections, strong premises 
for democratic consolidation.  
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What's happening with Social Democratic Party of Moldova? 
Gheorghii Sergheev, 10 March 2004  
 
 
With almost one year left until the 2005 parliamentary elections, there is an 
abundance of initiatives calling on uniting opposition forces in a single, or two or 
three electoral blocs. On the one hand, Christian Democrat Popular Party leader Iurie 
Rosca launched the idea of a single "anticommunist" electoral bloc that would ensure 
power alternate, on the other hand Moldova Noastra Alliance, rejecting Christian-
Democrat's initiative, came up with its own one - to establish an electoral bloc that 
would bear the name of "Moldova Noastra" Alliance and would steer Moldova to the 
"third way". Negotiations already started in this respect, with Democratic Party and 
Social-Liberal Party joining the negotiation table.  
 
Out of all political parties having a more or less significant rating (2 - 3%), has so 
only the Social Democratic Party far been left out the negotiation table. And this 
because Social-Democrat leaders believe that they cannot be part of an electoral bloc 
presenting itself as an "anticommunist", solely because in such a poor country as 
Moldova is, such a bloc stands no chances whatsoever. And this because great many 
citizens have never experienced anything but Communism in their lives that would 
have given them a decent living. Therefore, Social-Democrats strongly believe that 
only a positive program bearing no "anti" and clearly outlining modern social-
democratic principles as well as foreign policy principles would bring political parties 
together in an electoral bloc.  
 
On the other hand, Social-Democrat leaders believe Moldova Noastra's initiative lacks 
the very same principles outlined above. Moreover, "the third way" recently presented 
by one of the Moldova Noastra's leaders, Serafim Urechean, merely concealed the 
lack of clear-cut founding principles for the bloc. An evidence to this is the fact that 
negotiations on establishing Moldova Noastra bloc started by talks on criteria for 
drawing candidate lists. Supposedly, 6:2:2 (Moldova Noastra, Democratic Party, and 
Social-Liberal Party) algorithm for drawing the candidate lists is based on each of the 
parties election results in the previous electoral campaign, party rating in the recent 
opinion polls, party contribution to large scale events in the recent years, and number 
of parties that joined each of them in the last 3 years. Although in principle any kind 
of algorithm may lay the foundation of an electoral bloc, the one proposed by 
Moldova Noastra Alliance has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, the 6:2:2 formula 
significantly decreases the bloc's flexibility to accept new members. Any 2-3% 
eventually brought to Moldova Noastra Alliance by other parties might prove decisive 
in establishing majority faction in Parliament after elections. Secondly, the criteria on 
the number of parties that previously joined the three main parties due to form 
Moldova Noastra Alliance shows that the three are still very much fragmented and 
dominated by former political "clans", which might pose a threat to the stability of the 
would be governing. Under those circumstances it is not the core principles outlined 
in the program that do prevail, but rather the interests of the "clans" that succeeded 
each other in power. They call this political pragmatism. One might close his eyes on 
this, if it were not for the bitter experience of the previous three electoral cycles. At 
that time we had "political clans" in power promoting their own corporate interests, 
rather than political parties pursuing their value-based electoral programs. As a result 
we ended having what we have today.  
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There is no room for the Social-Democratic Party in this scheme. That is why the 
party was left out the negotiations on establishing Moldova Noastra Alliance. Albeit it 
was never represented in Parliament, Social-Democratic Party of Moldova always has 
had a clear stance on the major socio-political developments in the Republic of 
Moldova. Social-Democratic Party of Moldova, which is as old as political pluralism 
is in Moldova, has sworn allegiance to its core principles and values and any 
deviation from them might tarnish its image.  
 
Political pluralism in the former Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic started with 
national issues being brought to limelight by "public movements" such as People's 
Front of Moldova, Internationalist Movement "Unitatea-Edinstvo", Gaguz Halki and 
"Vozrojdenie", against the decline of the Communist Party of the URSS. While the 
last two, representing Gagauz and Bulgarians operated at the regional level - at the 
south of the country, in Chisinau political pluralism came down to confrontations 
between Communist Party joined by "Unitatea-Edinstvo" Internationalist Movement, 
and Peoples' Front. After the first wave of enthusiasm and phobia brought up by the 
1989 linguistic legislation, calmed down, the two camps represented only narrow 
segments of the population, whereas the rest of the people remained disoriented and 
depressed. At the same time the message of the Peoples' Front, associated at that time 
with the "national liberation movement of Romanians from the occupied territories", 
ruled out any remote possibility of consolidating the society on both banks of 
Dniester. Moreover it was abusively employed to consolidate the anti-state separatism 
in industrial megalopolis to the left of Dniester and Bender.  
 
In the autumn of 1989, the materials of the Stockholm Congress of Socialist 
International reached Chisinau from Estonia and did stir up a lot of debates among 
those dissatisfied with the political realities in Moldova. As a result, on 13May 1990 
the founding congress of the Social-Democratic Party of Moldova convened. That 
was the first party to promote the values of European social democracy. The program 
adopted at the Congress included rather innovative provisions for that time. For the 
first time ever during soviet times, it was declared that Republic of Moldova should 
become a sovereign state, that only private property was able to really free the citizens 
from the state, and that all the citizens of the country regardless of their ethnic origin 
should be equal under law and Constitution. Noteworthy, that at the beginning the 
party was headed by five co-chairs. The idea was to establish a party pursuing 
democratic values, and in doing so, resolve other problems, including interethnic 
relationships.  
 
In fourteen years, the social-democratic values have gone astray from the post-
totalitarian realities. Social-Democratic Party was very active before 1994 when the 
first elections on party lists were held and it didn't miss any opportunity to make 
constructive propositions. Noteworthy, in 1990 Parliament voted the privatisation 
plan recommended by the Social-Democrats. Also it was the only party that tried to 
head Republic of Moldova off the armed conflict trap in 1992. Afterwards the party 
came up with the scenario of adopting a New Constitution and convening Constituent 
Assembly.  
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Social-democrats' 3.66% in the 1994 elections did not get them to Parliament. A 
major crisis within the party followed, as many party members sought to get closer to 
power, namely to former Chair of the Parliament Petru Lucinski. At least under the 
ruling of Anatol Taranu, on the eve of 1996 presidential elections, Social Democrats 
were the only ones to openly support Petru Lucinschi.  
 
This internal crisis culminated in 1998, when Gheorghe Sima group left Social-
Democratic Party. The old team headed by Oazu Nantoi took over the party 
leadership. Those changes in the party leadership, coupled with rumours about 
scission in the party, tarnished the party's image and impeded its access to potential 
voters.  
 
In early 2000 the party adopted a strategy to prepare for parliamentary elections due 
in 2002 and designated its own candidate for December 2000 presidential elections. 
The party staked its future on Oazu Nantoi, whose participation in presidential race 
was to boost the party rating. Nantoi's resignation from Government in March 2000 
and the VII Congress of the Social-Democratic Party were just the first steps towards 
launching its own candidate.  
 
However, we all know how the 2000 presidential race ended - "democrats" together 
with Communists amended the Constitution, thereby the president was no longer 
elected by people but rather by the Parliament. Falling themselves in the trap they set, 
the Parliament was dissolved and anticipated parliamentary elections were scheduled 
for February 25, 2001. It's not a secret any more, that back then Democratic Party 
refused to run together with the Social-Democrats. The efforts undertaken by the 
Social-Democratic Party to establish a "large and strong" bloc to be headed by 
Serafim Urecheanu failed also. The 2.48% votes cast for the Social-Democrats saved 
the party from imminent death and did not help to the party consolidation on Moldova 
political landscape either.  
 
Long debates and search of the party's role and place culminated at the VIII Congress 
of the Party held on February 1, 2004. It was clear that unless Social Democratic 
Party changed its image and adopted a new approach in reaching out voters, the Party 
was doomed. For that particular reason Oazu Nantoi came with a proposition for Ion 
Musuc (famous businessman in telecommunications) to take over the party leadership 
and refused he himself to be designated. As a result, the Congress brought about the 
consolidation of the party.  
 
It should be mentioned that Ion Musuc was not new to the party. Back in 1999 Social 
Democrats insisted on his candidacy for the position of Mayor of Chisinau 
Municipality. Later on, Ion Musuc worked closely with Social-Democrats, however 
without making a big deal out of it.  
 
One thing is for sure, Social Democratic Party of Moldova is running short of time 
given that there is only one year left until the next parliamentary elections. Nor does 
the political context play in its favour. On the one hand, once again there is a strive to 
establish an "anticommunist" coalition " that Social Democrats cannot join. On the 
other hand a Moldova Noastra alliance is being founded on criteria far from being 
based on the values shared by the Social-Democrats. Under those circumstances 
Social Democratic Party has finally got a chance to break away from the traditional  
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schemes "Communists versus anticommunist" or "let's win the elections first and then 
decide what is to be done" and provide the society with a real alternative - a 
consistent, predictable and doctrinaire party.  
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Public television: to be or not to be? 
Alex Florea, 16 March 2004  
 
e-journal, II year, no. 26, 16 March 2004 
 
The issue of public television has been in the public gaze quite regularly. And there 
are enough grounds for this, to mention just frequent changes to the laws on public 
television, establishment of a strike committee and the strike that followed, Observer 
Council and election of the company Chair, censorship, statements of the 
Anticensorship Committee, persecution of journalists that took part in the protest 
rallies, etc.  
 
Therefore the key question here is whether we'll have a public television after all or 
not? The answer to this simple question depends on too many factors. So, let's 
consider some of them.  
 
Historically, since its establishment in 1958 National Television enjoyed a relative 
freedom only once, namely between 1989-1993, when the old regime was falling 
apart, whereas new power did not took over the control yet. Censorship existed at that 
time as well, however journalists were doing their job trying to be unbiased and 
impartial. An illustration to this effect was a popular show at that times "Unda 
Tineretului" featuring representatives of parties of every ideological stripe: Peoples' 
Front, "Edinstvo", "Vozrojdenie" and "Gagauz Halki". People greatly enjoyed that 
freedom and when it came to 1991 "putsch" they stood up and defended the 
Television and Radio.  
 
However, that short period was not enough for the free speech to grow roots in 
Moldova. The importance of free media was not fully acknowledged. That it was 
indeed so, became quite clear in 1994 when Council of Europe recommended New 
Independent States to turn local television and radio into public institutions. The new 
political elite in the Republic of Moldova claiming to be a democratic one complied 
with those recommendations only partially. Parliament passed the Law on 
Audiovisuals only in 1995. The positive thing about the law was that for the first time 
ever Television was granted the status of public institution. It was to be run by an 
Audio-visual Council. Back then, de jure television and radio were no longer under 
the state control and supposedly reflected the interests of the entire society, however 
de facto nothing did change. In 1997 Parliament amended the law so as to be solely 
entitled to appoint or oust Television and Radio leadership (later one this provision 
was abrogated).  
 
Henceforth, no progress whatsoever has been made. Under the new Law on National 
Audio-Visual Public Institution "Teleradio-Moldova", its Chair is to be elected by the 
Observer Council. The latter was formed in such a manner as to keep it under the 
control of the ruling party. I have already pointed that Television has practically never 
been free. Since 1990 ten Chairs have succeeded each other and this mainly for 
political reasons. For instance, each time a fresh legislature came to power or 
whenever a Chair sought more independence, the leadership was changed again. An 
illustration to this effect is Sergiu Prodan who had the chance to run the company for 
only three months.  
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All of the aforesaid has brought Moldovan audio-visual in the attention of European 
institutions. Recent developments in public television and radio were on the agenda of 
Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly lately. Referring to Moldova, raporteur 
Pascal Mooney stated that the amendment of the Law twice that year did not bring 
any positive changes. Once again Council of Europe voiced its fears to the effect that 
the liquidation of the state company so as to establish a public television might be 
surreptitiously employed to get rid of less loyal journalists.  
 
The aforesaid concerns stem from the fact that there are no clear-cut criteria for hiring 
back former employees of the liquidated company. Many of the former and current 
employees indicated, at least in private, that great many of the employees are very 
much of a burden for Television and Radio. They cite a "burden" of around 50-70% 
of the total 1,500 employees. To put it differently by preserving all 1,500 employees 
the company is not able to remunerate accordingly the most talented and efficient 
journalists. On the other hand, we are running the risk that when hiring, the company 
leadership would recruit precisely from the "burden" pool, so as to minimise the 
number of those who would dare to challenge the company policy.  
 
That is why two positions dominate the discussions on the future of the company: the 
first one severely criticises the company as such and its outputs, whereas the second 
under the pretext of protecting employees' interests opposes any kind of change.  
 
So far, the lack of transparency and clear-cut criteria of recruitment has given rise to 
numerous speculations and fears. One thing is for sure, there is quite a number of 
professional journalists at the Moldovan TV that other TV channels would gladly 
invite. Therefore, age should definitely not be among the selection criteria, as it was 
gossiped.  
 
One of the reasons for criticising the so-called public institution is that its news 
programs feature quite a number of "bureaucrat" reports, which existed even before 
2001. The 1995 Law on Audiovisuals provided that public audio-visual institutions 
were to broadcast free of charge press releases of public interest issued by Parliament, 
Presidency and Government. Although this provision ran counter to European 
standards, opposition that at that time was in power did nothing to change it.  
 
The aforesaid examples once again confirm that audio-visual problems are deep-
rooted. Once the Communist Party came to power it took full advantage of the 
practices that had been in use for years. They introduced a more subtle, i.e. 
"unofficial" censorship, hard-line when it came to editorial policy favourable to the 
incumbent ruling.  
 
Amid those growing signs, the issue of audio-visual public institution has taken the 
centre stage again. Ruling Communist Party was forced to adopt a law on public 
audio-visual institution (by the PACE resolution), thereby establishing an Observer 
Council that was to elect the Chair of the Public Institution. Albeit Communists 
formally complied with the recommendations, at a closer look one may find that once 
again nothing has really changed. After being adopted in 2002 the law was amended 
several times. One of the most important amendments excluded the notion of "non-
profit" from the law. The move came after a new Chair, Artur Efremov was elected 
and set on transforming the public institution into a profitable business, thereby  
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"getting television and radio out of poverty". That was an inaccurate interpretation, 
for several reasons:  
 
1. All the audio-visual public institutions throughout the world are non-profit. 
This is one of the core elements that allow them to be autonomous from 
interest groups and money interests.  
 
2. In mass media, as well as in any kind of business, one has to invest first and 
earn a profit afterwards. Therefore, state funding (around 8 million Lei) should 
not be abolished. The money could be used, let's say, for updating the 
equipment that is quite obsolete. 
 
3. In a country with dire economic straits, not a single TV or radio station stands 
the chance of being profitable. Even in Russia or Romania law prices on 
advertising could not cover huge costs of running a TV or radio station. That 
is yet another reason why there is no independent press in Moldova, whereas 
the number of domestic TV channels is close to zero.  
 
It was probably these factors that led to the recent dismissal of the Chair, surprisingly 
unanimously voted by the entire Observer Council. This unanimous vote has raised 
some eyebrows, probably disclosing some conflicts of interests. But this is yet another 
story.  
 
One thing is for sure audio-visual public institution may not be privatised. It belongs 
to the society and is to be funded from public funds, thereby avoiding any excessive 
control from the Government. Of course this is an ideal story. In reality though, none 
of the parties that have been in power since independence was keen to free the state 
TV and radio, rather they viewed them as useful tools for influencing public opinion 
during election campaigns and afterwards. This seems to be the reason why the 
outgoing Chair of "Teleradio-Moldova" strove to turn the public institution into a 
profitable business, thereby formally it would be a public institution, while de facto it 
would be run by business moguls shaping its editorial policy. Noteworthy, in 
Moldova some business is very close to power. An illustration to this effect is a recent 
report on the national TV news bulletin featuring a businessman making a donation to 
an orphanage, a rather innocent event if it were not for a Communist mogul who 
showed up at the event. So it wasn't quite clear what was that official doing there in 
the first place and what the two had in common.  
 
Breaching those principles or lack thereof generates rumours and speculations, 
thereby making the situation even worse. Allegedly, Public Company has closed its 
bank accounts in the Social Bank and opened new ones in a private bank close to the 
ruling party. Moreover, sources say the new draft of the bylaws of "Teleradio-
Moldova" provides that revenues from commercial activities are to be used for charity 
(see the example above) and not primarily for broadcasts. Data on the revenues as 
well as on how it is spent are to be classified. Any disclosure of such data is to be 
prosecuted. The draft also provides that the Chair of the Company is solely entitled to 
decide on how the revenues are to be spent. Those prerogatives have nothing to do 
with the status a public audio-visual institution should enjoy.  
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The draft of the bylaws developed by the outgoing Company leadership referred also 
to the editorial policy. Both public radio and TV are to have social, education and 
entertainment broadcasts for all the ages and interest groups. This is quite a 
challenging task. Under the draft, each department is to develop a business plan that 
would outline the sources of funding for the aforesaid broadcasts.  
 
The thing is that the Law on Sponsorship does not provide any incentives to the 
sponsors. Moreover, the lack of charity tradition in the country would not exactly help 
raising funds for social broadcasts. Businessmen would rather give money for such 
shows as "Miss Moldova" or bodybuilding contests. None of them has given a penny 
in the last 5-10 yeas for broadcast covering such issues as elderly or orphanages. 
Furthermore, knowing full well the clampdowns in place to control small-to-middling 
business, it is very unlikely that the latter would rush in sponsoring broadcasts on 
corruption either.  
 
Although, the incumbent ruling party has learned many of the past lessons, it does not 
seem to realise yet that they will not stay in power forever and that by tailoring laws 
to suit their own interests, they'll have to live by them when in opposition. If they 
were jolted into realising that there is another side to the ledger, then they would 
probably produce laws in the society interests, rather than in their own.  
 
Once again we have to acknowledge that since its inception as a public TV institution 
a decade ago, nothing seems to have changed. That is why, sad as it may seem, 
subjectiveness and bias would be part of media coverage of social, economic, and 
political processes for many years ahead, despite the fact that National TV enjoys a 
public institution status.  
 
On the other hand, the fact that journalists are uniting their efforts in fighting 
censorship at the television and are promoting professionalism is quite encouraging. 
Firing employees or cancelling TV shows cannot remain secret any longer. 
International organisations, such as Council of Europe, European Union and OSCE 
express lingering concerns and disapprove of the attempts to limit in any way the 
freedom of speech or wield heavy pressure on journalists. Therefore, authorities are 
put in a position to take adequate measures.  
 
Under those circumstance it is up to the civil society whether Republic of Moldova 
would ever have a true public television that would exist for the society and be 
supported by the society at large.  
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Authoritarian tendencies 
24 March 2004  
 
 
Moldovan authorities' actions have resembled more and more those of the Belarus 
authorities lately. This similarity is visible in every respect. The same ruling style, the 
same political discourse, the same treatment of the opposition, the same control over 
media that has been turned into a propaganda tool, the same personnel policy that 
only spurs corruption, the same treatment of business i.e. put under pressure, 
expropriated or excessively controlled, and finally the same attitude towards 
international democratic institutions, which are not only been overlooked but also 
assaulted.  
 
On the one hand, it is perfectly reasonable that things are as they are, especially since 
one of the promises ruling party made in elections was bringing Republic of Moldova 
into the Russia-Belarus Union. It is all-too-clear that only regimes sharing similar 
values and believes may merge. Still during its first years in power ruling party was 
far more cautious. That caused much sadness among party dogmatics who used to 
bemoan that President Voronin was neither Fidel Castro, albeit he had promised to 
turn Moldova into a European Cuba, nor at least Alexandr Lukasenko.  
 
Probably, leaders of the ruling party decided to stop disappointing their followers and 
therefore with fresh polls in legislature coming they more often resort to the 
Lukashenko's methods of keeping social, political and economic life under control, 
which by all means is of paramount importance in securing victory in elections. There 
are evidences to this effect.  
 
For a start, Moldovan authorities seem to follow Belarus example in dealing with the 
cut-off of foreign political and financial support. In this respect Lukashenko 
established partnership ties with Libya, whereas Moldovan authorities with Kuwait. 
Official propaganda did it best in reporting that the credit to be provided to Moldova 
as a result of the official visit paid by President Voronin to Kuwait, was provided on 
the very same terms as the ones granted by international monetary institutions. 
However, in contrast to IMF and WB, Kuwait did not require any economic reforms, 
or halting private business persecution. Similarly, governmental propaganda couldn't 
help admiring Kuwait's lack of political parties as such, as well as the fact that Emir's 
words are equal to law, that is the case of Belarus as well, which has become a source 
of inspiration for Moldovan authorities.  
 
Another source of inspiration was the way Lukashenko settles scores with his political 
foes. Thus in Belarus the legislative body lacks a financial department, function 
overtaken by the presidential office. Whenever, deputies are due to pay official visits 
they have to ask the presidency to cover their expenses, i.e. explain the purpose of the 
visit and ask for permission. Similarly, this practice gains grounds in Moldova. Under 
a draft law endorsed by Government in January public officers should ask the 
permission of State Chancellery first and notify Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the 
purpose of a foreign visit or any invitation they had issued to foreign counterparts. It 
is indeed a normal practice to co-ordinate official visits paid by high rank dignitaries. 
However, those rules should not apply to private visits. Serafim Urechean's recent 
private visit to Moscow, who is seen as number 1 foe of the ruling party, has outraged  
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Communist party moguls. They suspected Chisinau Mayor of gaining Moscow's 
support, thereby unseating Vladimir Voronin. On this occasion government controlled 
media featured a number of articles and reports on how incumbent Mayor would be 
persecuted for breaching the new rules.  
 
Another a la Lukashenko stunt was the reaction to OSCE Head of Mission statement. 
William Hill had been accused by Presidential Councillor Mark Tkaciuk of interfering 
in the internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova and turning the mission into an 
electoral office of the opposition. Belarus authorities did the very same thing on the 
eve of presidential elections of September 2001 that led to the shut down of OSCE 
Mission in Belarus.  
 
What is striking is the fact that head of OSCE Mission in Moldova was criticised for 
simply reiterating the conclusions of the Mission's reports produced after last 
parliamentary elections, recommending among others lowering the 6% threshold of 
representation. In the three years since OSCE report was made public, Moldovan 
authorities did not follow on it so as to establish a level playing field for all 
contestants, but on the contrary raised further barriers by introducing the progressive 
threshold of up to 12% for electoral blocs. Having said that the only thing left for the 
Mission was to stood up for rights of the 28% of citizens whose votes were simply 
neglected and were redistributed mainly to the Communist Party. The latter is not in 
the Communist Party's best interest as it secured them an extra 40% of mandates. 
Consequently, nowadays they are able to pursue policies that run counter to the 
interests of the half a million people who did vote but whose options were not 
represented in Parliament.  
 
Still, there are many differences between Republic of Moldova and Belarus. 
Incumbent ruling party seized the power in Moldova seven years after Lukashenko 
did, when the economic, political and legal landscape was totally different from that 
in 1994. Nevertheless, considering Moldova's veering towards Belarus model one 
may easily predict how would be Moldova treated by international community, 
neighbourhood countries, including Russia, if it follows the same path, especially 
since it declared joining EU as one of its top priorities.  
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Fire on headquarters! 
Igor Botan, 30 March 2004  
 
e-journal, II year, no. 27, 30 March 2004 
 
1. Background  
 
Although oppositions' efforts in establishing a single electoral coalition do not inspire 
much confidence, this did not stop ruling party from engaging in a large-scale 
campaign aimed at denigrating and breaking it apart. And this because, weak and 
shattered as it is, opposition claims it seeks to seize the power amidst worsening 
social and economic conditions, largely due to sharp price hike on energy and food. 
What makes things even worse is that public funds are wasted to keep a soaring 
bureaucratic apparatus brought by the incumbent governance led administrative-
territorial revision.  
 
Also, ruling party's economic policies tarnish the image the country is projecting 
abroad, as well as its investment climate. As if to underline this point, 10 
Ambassadors including USA, EU together with heads of international monetary 
institutions and Council of Europe had publicly expressed their lingering concerns 
with regard to authorities' attempts to strangle businesses in Moldova. Moreover, 
diplomats' act followed shortly after Presidency's attacks on OSCE Head of Mission 
in Moldova.  
 
Relations with major foreign partners, including Russia, worsened as well. Recently 
Vladimir Putin chose to talk ways of settling Transdnistrian conflict with separatist 
leader Igor Smirnov rather than President Voronin.  
 
All of the aforesaid emerged after last year local elections that showed a slight 
decrease in Communists' rating and that amidst better economic and political climate 
than today. If things go on like this, Communists run the risk of falling short of votes 
so as to control the entire state machine. Under those circumstance there are two 
things that could secure Communists a landslide victory: resorting to administrative 
levers and keeping opposition shattered and frustrated.  
 
Accordingly, those were the goals that Communists set for themselves. President 
Voronin made them public during one of the Communist Party plenary sessions last 
summer. Back then, referring to Moldova Noastra Alliance (Our Moldova) President 
said: "It would be inexcusable for us to sit and wait until our political foes start 
fighting. Only naives in politics may underestimate their ability to unite together upon 
crisis; though political naiveness has been always liable". Recently President Voronin 
was more explicit when saying that Christian Democratic Peoples' Party "is to be 
neutralised".  
 
Those words were in fact calls for action. In this sense, Moldovan situation is very 
much reminiscent to that of China when on the eve of Communist plenary in 1996 
Great Helmsman Mao called for "Fire on headquarters!" Afterwards the so-called 
squads of "hunveibins" armed with Mao's quotations proceeded to settling scores with 
his political foes. As a result only in the Communist Party Central Committee 90 out 
of the total 170 members were "neutralised".  
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2. Techniques  
 
Propagandists of Moldovan state-run media or that affiliated to ruling party acts like 
"hunveibins", thereby triggering backlashes, especially as the state-run media 
supposedly should not engage in the information war between power and opposition. 
On the contrary, one may find that state-run media attacks on opposition are 
methodist and well co-ordinated so as to secure a maximal impact in ridiculing, 
denigrating and disorienting it.  
 
For instance after Communist majority faction withdrew the parliamentary immunity 
and started the criminal investigation on the Christian-Democrat leaders, state-run 
media has systematically set upon them featuring them as an extremist group just 
because they protest against Russia's failure to comply with its obligation to withdraw 
munitions and troops from the soil of Transdnistria, which is separate from Moldova 
and is controlled by citizens of Russia. What is striking is the discrepancy between 
Russia's supportive attitude towards its citizens, leaders of the breakaway 
Transdnestrian regime, who usurped the power on a portion of Republic of Moldova 
territory, and Moldovan authorities' attitude towards its citizens who protest against 
such a state of affairs. As a result Christian-Democrats accused of extremism have a 
tighter berth for manoeuvres in coalition building.  
 
As for Moldova Noastra Alliance (MNA), the goal is to disunite its leaders by having 
a differentiate approach to each of them. Thus, Co-Chair Veceaslav Untila is mocked 
by the very same state-run media for issuing irrelevant declarations, or for serving 
previously in road police. Other Co-chair, Dumitru Braghis, albeit ridiculed for 
statements made four years ago, has been made a generous offer to share his social-
democratic aspirations in the state-run media, in the hope that it would reveal lack of 
cohesiveness in Moldova Noastra leaders' ideas. Preferential treatment Braghis has 
enjoyed lately and the declaration made by one of the MN's moguls to the effect that 
social-democratic wing headed by Braghis might leave the Alliance, have generated 
rumours that Braghis was made a proposition to replace Vasile Tarlev as a Prime 
Minister. Such rumours greatly undermine MN capacity to become a stable unifying 
centre for an eventual electoral bloc. The buzz is backed up by Braghis' previous 
intention to keep Prime Minister seat expressed on numerous occasions after 
Communists' victory in 2001 elections.  
 
And yet the third MNA Co-chair, Serafim Urechean, is also permanently under fire. 
Those systematic and well co-ordinated attacks started two years ago. Back then, once 
early local elections were announced (later on cancelled by a Constitutional Court 
ruling) state-run media featured a denigrating article on Mayor Urechean accusing 
him of corruption and many other murky affairs. In parallel, state TV reported on 
street kids and again accused the mayor of ignoring their problems, in contrast to 
Russian President Putin (?!), who at that time engaged in solving their problems in his 
own country. On top of that, Urechean was presented as rather conservative, not even 
appreciating such a popular band as "Zdop si Zdup", whom President Voronin himself 
awarded state orders.  
 
 23
That was the first sign for Serafim Urechean that ruling party was not on his side and 
in fact sought to step him down, albeit until that very moment he had been spoiled by 
state-run media and in fact surreptitiously employed it throughout his 1999 campaign. 
And that despite Urechean's openness to collaborate with the ruling party at the very 
beginning. One year later Urechean claimed that back then President offered him an 
Ambassador position in exchange for not running for Chisinau Mayoralty.  
 
Henceforth, Chisinau Mayor has been a target of political flak, with state-run media 
insistently working towards discrediting Urechean's image and his managerial skills. 
Most recently it was announced that several criminal investigations against Mayor 
Urechean are almost completed. Moreover, based on preliminary investigation of a 
special commission, governmental press alleged that "Wheat Mafia" seeking to 
undermine the incumbent ruling by increasing the price on breadstuffs, which was 
uncovered by President Voronin himself during a recent Supreme Security Council 
session, was after all headed by Serafim Urechean.  
 
On top of that, Urechean regularly faces all kinds of administrative barriers. The 
recent announcement by the Communist faction in the Municipal Council that it 
would be in intransigent opposition to the Mayor would only further the ongoing 
backfire between ruling party and MNA leader.  
 
 
3. Possible outcomes  
 
Having in mind authorities' actions in the previous electoral campaign when several 
candidates running for mayoralty had been arrested and released immediately after 
elections, similar actions are to be expected in the upcoming elections. For example if 
opposition managed to build a coalition that would pose a threat to ruling party, 
criminal investigations against Christian-Democrats and Serafim Urechean would be 
resumed so as to, let's say, convict them and suspend the sentence on probation. This 
way, opposition would be decapitated right on the eve of elections by prohibiting their 
names to be included in the candidate lists.  
 
When under fire opposition leaders are tensed and suspicious of each other. 
Moreover, amidst those growing concerns, they would hardly engage in party 
building or effective dialogue with smaller parties, i.e. potential partners, in view of 
forming electoral coalitions.  
 
Leaving aside harassment by governors, the actions of MNA leaders raised a few 
eyebrows. To establish the much-publicised coalition under the auspices of MNA it 
was simply enough to launch a dialogue on one simple condition, parties at the 
negotiation table should not make any public statements until the end of negotiations 
or until they decide to leave the negotiation table for good. Normally, basic principles 
and algorithm for building the coalition were to be worked out in the course of 
negotiations. However, MNA set some conditions right from the beginning as to what 
algorithm should be used in drawing the candidate lists, including such criteria as 
number of parties that merged before. Thereby, they have drawn authorities' attention 
to the way MNA itself was established. In fact it was discovered that the merger 
wasn't completed yet, although almost one year passed. After this incident, would-be  
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coalition partners may want to give another thought as to MNA' organisational 
potential.  
 
Nor do the actions undertaken by MNA' potential allies inspire much optimism. They 
rant about the conditions set by MNA at press conferences, saying that a coalition 
would not be possible. And this per se is a visible evidence to the efficiency of the 
"fire on headquarters" strategy. Moreover, opposition runs the risk of engaging itself 
in a "backlash", an illustration to this effect are the media outlets affiliated to 
Christian Democrats and to MNA. This backlash serves the best interests of the ruling 
party.  
 
The concluding point to be made is that it remains to be seen yet what regroupings are 
likely to happen. For now, opposition runs out of time in managing to regroup, build a 
coalition and go public as an organised and competitive force.  
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Competition of ideas for the public good 
Igor Botan, 14 April 2004  
 
e-journal, II year, no. 28, 14 April 2004 
 
Political life has been dominated lately by a competition of ideas among the leaders of 
the major political forces. So far, it's too early to say for sure whether the ideas voiced 
really clarify on political offers, or on the contrary complicate things even further. 
Let's consider each of them in greater detail.  
 
 
Moldova Noastra (Our Moldova) Alliance  
 
It is all-too-clear that the efforts to unite political forces in view of 2005 parliamentary 
elections have been the major incentive for the competition of ideas. Chisinau Mayor 
and Co-chairperson of Our Moldova, Serafim Urechean, was one of the political 
leaders to engage in the race. Two months ago he published in "Moldavskie 
Vedomosti" (no. 619) a program article entitled "Moldova has to have a dream", 
which was to be turned latter on into a "national idea" called "European project".  
 
"The three years Communist Party was in power were lost for the Republic of 
Moldova" believes Urechean, therefore he wonders "aren't authorities aware of the 
fact that friendship with Russia does not stem from political or economic conjuncture" 
but rather is a historic choice of Moldova? Also, Urechean believes Republic of 
Moldova's strategic goal should be "alpha and omega of our movement forward - 
European integration, Republic of Moldova accession to EU".  
 
The author believes for the "Moldova's dream" to come true, authorities should refrain 
from teetering between East and West and accept a "middle way" of good relations 
with the West and East alike. That in turn, would enable Republic of Moldova to 
become a "Switzerland of the Balkans" by exploiting the advantages of its geographic 
location. "The golden middle way" stands according to Urechean for "organic 
integration of Moldova in the South-Eastern Europe's free trade area", as well as in 
"the CIS single economic zone comprising Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus".  
Later on, another Our Moldova Co-chair Dumitru Braghis relayed the race by 
publishing in "Saptamina" weekly (no. 587) an article entitled "The System". The gist 
of the article refers to the fact that before engaging in pursuing the "national idea", 
one should diagnose political regime in Moldova first. He goes on saying "We never 
fully acknowledged that we are the hostages of a SYSTEM, that operates in line with 
the following formula: money-fear-lie. The parties we established were unable to 
overcome self-preservation instinct upstart, whereas the only values that mattered 
were money and fear". According to Braghis, President Voronin himself was the 
hostage of the System that operated by means of the so-called "soldiers of the 
System", whose goal was to parasitise on the society "body". The methods used by the 
"soldiers of the System" resumed to corrupting state institutions.  
 
The solution proposed by Braghis resumes to: "today political class should regroup its 
forces, regardless of their position - right, centre, or left wing. We should eliminate 
the soldiers of the System". And this coming from one of the most efficient Prime-
Ministers Moldova has ever saw, who managed throughout almost one year and a half  
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in power (1999-2001) to set an economic growth for the first time ever since 1998 
Russian financial crisis and this without a stable endorsement from the Parliament. He 
also managed to settle the arrears to pensions and wages. In spite of this, to express 
his thoughts Braghis resorts to the third person plural, giving the impression that his 
article published only two weeks prior to Easter, was a call to repentance. 
Interestingly enough, two days after the article was published, another repentance 
article "The Crisis of Russian Liberalism" was published by Russian Oligarch Mihail 
Hodorkovskii jailed in Moscow. A rather curious coincidence that stands as an 
evidence to the fact that the post-soviet countries' elites are entering the "repentance 
zodiac". If it is indeed so, then Moldovan party leaders responded to the call for 
repentance by releasing on the eve of Easter a raft of party documents targeting the 
public good.  
 
 
Social Democratic Party  
 
Last week Social-Democrat's leaders launched the "Social-Democrat Manifestos". 
Social-Democrats reject anti-Communist rhetoric. Their offer includes edifying a state 
based on the democratic socialism doctrine, thus replacing the "wild capitalism 
promoted by the previous rulings". The Manifestos proposes new benchmarks to the 
society for identifying a "national idea", other than those put forward by Our 
Moldova.  
Social-democrats question the originality of the programmatic ideas voiced by the two 
Our Moldova Co-chairs. Their allusion is quite clear - there is no need to invent a 
"middle way", it would do for Moldova to step on the Social-Democratic path, which 
proved to be so successful in Western Europe. Social-democrats believe: a) 
Ureachean's idea to turn Moldova into a "Switzerland of the Balkans" was launched 
long ago in autumn of 2001 by President Voronin Councillors. It is also true that the 
latter intended to exploit the contradictions between East and West, whereas Urechean 
insists on capitalising on good ties with both of them; b) the proposition to follow the 
"middle way" by combining "historic choice of Moldova, i.e. Russia" with the 
"strategic goal - joining EU" was not new either, it had been also voiced by President 
Voronin in October 2002 when he called on the CIS integration in EU; c) that we are 
the hostages of a System we are well-aware for more than 10 years since former 
President Petru Lucinski published his work "Hostages"; d) we are also familiar with 
the formula the System operates on, disclosed by the incumbent President Vladimir 
Voronin back when Communists were in opposition, i.e. money - power -money.  
 
From this perspective Braghis' contribution towards cataloguing the System resumed 
to adding that after the 2001 Communists' landslide victory, the System has been 
based not only on "money and power", but also "fear and lies".  
 
 
Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party  
 
Although there is little hope, Christian-Democrats still seek to form a single 
anticommunist opposition bloc. Nevertheless, last week Christian-Democrats showed 
that that they were good not only in anticommunist rhetoric, but also in covering a 
broader spectrum. They believe "modern doctrines stemming from Judaeo-Christian 
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tradition provide an organic view of the man and the world that bring the human 
being in the centre of society attention, which is spiritually governed by God". This  
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"humanist concept ascribes a complementing and organic unity to the relationship 
between man and woman". To translate those ideas into practice Christian-Democrats 
decided to "have 50% women and 50% men on its electoral lists that are to be enlisted 
in a successive order, one after another".  
 
 
Would-be "Great Russia"  
 
Several weeks ago Russian language weekly "Kommersant Plus" pledged to become 
the unifying centre of a new pro-Russian political force. The action is entitled "Great 
Russia". Several parties were invited to join, namely Socialist Party, Party of 
Socialists, "Ravnopravie" Social-political Movement, "Pro-Moldova" public 
association. In addition, groups not registered with the Ministry of Justice were 
invited, such as the branch of the National Bolshevik Party of Russia, New 
Komsomolists, etc. Anti-globalisation is what unites all of them together. Would-be 
"Great Russia" harshly criticises Moldovan authorities' relations with EU, USA, and 
international monetary organisations.  
 
They plead for the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova whose 
future is staked on tighter integration with the East. They believe western values are 
not adequate to Moldovan realities, rather they are pseudo-values. Their main target is 
Communist leaders who revised socialist and communist ideas, as well as strategic 
partnership with Russia, factors that brought them to power in 2001. Later on, 
Communists just exploited these ideas to enrich the clan in power and those affiliated 
to it. In the eyes of Great Russia the greatest "sin" of the ruling party was its refusal to 
sign the so-called "Kozak Memorandum" on settling Transdnistrian conflict via 
federalising the country.  
 
One of Great Russia's pragmatic goals is to steal Communists' votes, especially those 
of the Russian speakers. They claim they are able to steal as much as 40% of the 
Communists' electorate.  
 
 
Party of Communists  
 
President Voronin response to the aforesaid was an exclusive interview to the "Misli" 
(The Thought) magazine (see "Communistul" no. 411) - "The power is not 
surrendered - the power is conquered". Indeed, President Voronin knows no rivals in 
his expertise on the "anatomy of power" in the Republic of Moldova. He insinuated 
that the Communist Party needs the power in as much as to turn it into "people's 
power". According to the President, the Communist Party program (currently being 
revised) might be summarised as "Republic, Peoples' Power, Socialism" was not yet 
completely enforced. And this because in their three years in power Communists had 
to build the "power vertical", essential to transform the state power into "people's 
power" by means of soviets.  
 
Still, the President outlined Communists' achievements during their three years in 
power, namely: "sovereignty, independence, democratisation of domestic and foreign 
policy". He went on wondering what other party could have installed parliamentary 
regime, thus pulling the country back from the brink of autocratic presidential regime;  
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what other party could have saved the country from the monstrous county 
administrative system by going back to rayons that bring them closer to the people; 
and what other party could have launched a raft of measures that gave birth to civil 
society in our country"? The answer is quite obvious.  
 
President Voronin also proposed a mechanism for the "peoples' power" to function, 
namely by placing in front of the mayoralties billboards featuring the electoral 
promises made by the elected officials, just like in Ancient Rome. According to him, 
should the Communist candidate, Vasile Zgardan, won the local elections, the 
mayoralty would have definitely boasted such a billboard.  
 
As placing advertising falls within the competence of the mayoralty, Chisinau Mayor 
Serafim Urechean, viewed as Communists' main political foe, might want making a 
gesture of good will and place a billboard featuring the promises he made throughout 
his campaign. Similarly to support the transfer of power to the people by means of 
"power vertical" a billboard featuring the promises made by Communists in elections 
might be placed in front of the Presidential office. If it happens, then may be political 
parties would be willing to respond to Braghis' call to join the forces for the sake of 
public good, thereby fulfilling electoral promises would be their only source of 
rivalry. Civil society that was born due to the Communists' efforts, as President 
himself likes to boast, could support this initiative as part of the Social Pact, also 
launched by President Voronin two years ago.  
 
 
Instead of conclusions  
 
Out of all political parties having a more or less political weight, only Democratic 
Party and Social-Liberal Party were left out from the competition of ideas for the 
public good, that prevents us from drawing any sound conclusions. However, it is 
known for a fact that those parties are negotiating with Our Moldova on establishing 
an electoral bloc.  
 
Unfortunately, Social-Liberal leaders known as good debaters and experts in 
diagnosing social vices, were busy dissociating the party from the statements of one 
of its Deputy Chairs, Nicolae Dabija, who published in "Literatura si arta" (no. 3057) 
an article "Rusoaicele-2" (Russian women -2). All political parties labelled it as 
xenophobic. Having said that, it seems the only way to reach a unity in party visions 
is to negate certain ideas. Unfortunately, Social-Liberal Party, viewed upon its 
foundation in 2001 as a party of hopes and a sign of renewal of Moldovan political 
elite, was the one to provide such a sad opportunity to Moldovan political elite.  
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Three years of Tarlev Government 
20 April 2004  
 
 
On April 19 three years passed since Tarlev's Government was sworn in. His ruling 
program "Economy's revival - country's revival" was aimed at solving three major 
issues outlined by President Voronin himself: Transdnistrian conflict, poverty 
reduction, and fighting corruption. Upon inauguration in office, Tarlev mentioned that 
a major condition towards enforcing the program was "efficient co-operation with all 
political forces and people of good faith". In fact, after three years in power the ruling 
party has found itself on bad terms with all the parties having more or less 
considerable political weight. In the eyes of Communists, the only "friendly party" is 
the Democratic Agrarian Party, which in the past parliamentary elections gathered 
around 1% of the total votes cast. Accordingly, the failure of "efficient co-operation 
between political forces" has revealed Moldovan authorities' inability to keep good 
ties with potential partners and opponents alike, both at home and abroad.  
 
For this particular reason, after three years in power the problems outlined by the 
President are far from being settled. As if to underline this point, at the closing session 
of the Parliament winter series President said "now, Transdnistrian conflict settlement 
mood remains ornery". Unfortunately, one may say so are the relationships with 
Moldova's major partners - Romania and Russia.  
 
Settling yet another strategic goal - poverty reduction - has been undermined by the 
Government's failure to get on better terms with international financial institutions. 
This has also thwarted foreign debt servicing. As a result, last year alone Moldova had 
to spend 1/3 of its budget revenues on paying back foreign debt. Government has also 
reached a deadlock in developing the Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth 
Strategy, in work for three years now, as the approval of its final version is being 
constantly adjourned.  
 
Noteworthy, previous Government headed by Dumitru Braghis adopted the National 
Program on Poverty Reduction back in June 2000. Backed by a raft of other measures 
that program has boosted a 1% economic growth. On top of that, the move alone has 
propelled Moldova's human development index further upwards from the 104 to the 
85th position among the 175 countries. And this amidst times when Moldova was 
struggling to get to grips with the 1998 Russian financial crisis.  
 
Strangely enough, the efforts of the incumbent Government that reports a 7% 
economic growth for three years in a row now have had an opposite effect. They 
pushed the very same index (calculated by UN based on life expectancy, level of 
education and living standards) down by 23 points to the 108 position. Indeed there 
must be a reasonable explanation to this: either there is something wrong with 
Moldovan economic statistics data, or if there is indeed an economic growth then it 
rests on factors other than those improving living standards of ordinary people. If so, 
than what's the use of economic growth, if it pushes human development index further 
downwards?  
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As for the third strategic issue, i.e. fighting corruption, last week Supreme Security 
Council endorsed the draft National Strategy on fighting corruption and National 
Action Plan to enforce the Strategy. Interestingly enough a similar program was 
approved by the Ion Sturza Government back in November 1999. Moreover, since 
independence more that 30 normative acts setting to "fight corruption" right from 
their title have been adopted, not to speak of another 300 acts where fighting 
corruption is mentioned one way or another. Nevertheless, during the last Supreme 
Security Council session (April 15, 2004) President said "Corruption hampers social-
economic development of our country, it undermines any reform and has become a 
real issue for the state security".  
 
The President couldn't have painted a bleaker picture than that, especially since he 
claimed corruption threatened state security. Oddly enough fighting corruption 
resumes to periodically, let's say once in a week, reporting on the state TV about some 
unfortunate officers caught on taking meagre bribes of several dozens or hundreds Lei 
(12 Lei ~ 1 $), or some small retailers smuggling goods not exceeding several 
thousand dollars. There is no doubt that this kind of corruption is the most widespread 
and that it is worth fighting it out. However, what is striking is that for three years 
now, authorities talk fighting fuel smuggling that has reached enormous proportions 
lately, amounting hundred millions of dollars. Though, it wouldn't have reached such 
a scale if it weren't for a silent approval of high-rank officials. Sugar smuggling has 
taken centre stage recently. It too has reached such a scale that it threatens to ruin the 
whole industry. And yet at this scale, efforts to fight corruption are not visible at all, 
amidst growing claims that there are several well-organised Mafias operating in the 
field. Recently people learned about the Mafia operating in the law enforcement 
forces and grain Mafia, on top of that last week President uncovered yet another 
Mafia, i.e. foresters' Mafia.  
 
The curious thing is that Chief Forester Anatol Popusoi, Director General of the 
"Moldsilva" State Sylvan Agency, also heads the Democratic Agrarian Party. The 
very same party President Voronin considered to be the only "friendly party". One 
may not question President's statement, especially since Agrarian Party was founded 
by former rural nomenclature and it, in fact, substituted the Communist Party while it 
was banned. Once Communist Party regained its rights, the two parties formed an 
electoral bloc and jointly ran in the 1999 local elections.  
 
This explains a lot, for a start the close ties between Communist Party and Democratic 
Agrarian Party and, conversely, the former's inability to keep similar ties with other 
parties. Having this close relationship in mind, one may found that while Communists 
have been for three years in power and the friendly Democratic Agrarian Party 
another six years (1992-1998), all in all the two have stayed in power for more then 
2/3 of Moldova's independence. It was during that time that privatisation legislation 
was passed and later on enforced. It was during that time that Moldova received the 
greatest bulk of foreign credits, which incumbent ruling party claimed to be stolen or 
frittered away.  
 
 32
Therefore, citizens' misfortune and the misfortune of the ruling party in achieving its 
strategic goals are deeply rooted in the personnel policy underpinned by the "power 
vertical" promoted by the ruling party, as well as in the friendships it had or it still 
holds to. However, in this particular case the famous saying "tell me who's your friend 
and I'll tell who you are" does not fully apply.  
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NATO is expanding, whereas Moldova ...shrinking? 
Viorel Cibotaru, 28 April 2004  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova e-journal, II year, no. 29, 28 April 2004 
 
As it was to be expected, Moldova's reactions to seven new states (Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) joining on April 2 the North 
Atlantic Treaty were reserved and prudent (from authorities) and contemplative and 
imminent (from opposition and analysts alike). In fact Moldova's stance was made 
public well before the event and was trivially covered by domestic media under the 
heading foreign festivities. In this respect, it is worth remembering majority faction's 
response to NATO Parliamentary Assembly two months ago "given Moldova's 
neutrality status as provided for in Constitution, ... Moldova would never become (or 
may not become) a NATO member". Still, it would be far more important to assess 
what's really going on in Moldova once NATO "has reached already Prut river".  
 
Now the question is, where would the three Western former soviet republics of the 
Community of Independent States end up? On the one hand, elites in Ukraine and 
Moldova have reiterated on numerous occasions their intentions to join EU. On the 
other hand, Belarus speaks of unifying with Russia. The developments in the three 
countries would definitely affect regional security. In this respect, neither important 
Ukraine nor tiny Moldova stand a chance to keep good ties with the West, while their 
military forces and other "armed structures of the state" remain largely unreformed 
and while their conduct of security affairs continues to be characterized by a 
conspicuous lack of transparency.  
 
As for Moldova, the inevitable question arises - what actions should be taken to 
reform security sector and raise its transparency? However, to answer that question 
one fact should be considered, i.e. Transdnistrian conflict is by far Moldova's biggest 
challenge when it comes to security. In addition, one should not forget that as long as 
Russian Federation is supporting secessionist regimes, there is always the risk that 
Moldova, which has stepped on the path of European integration, would step out or 
even turn back.  
 
Having said that, yet another question arises: what kind of military forces does 
Moldova really need? Supposedly, an answer is to be found in the 2002 Conception of 
Military Reform. However, uncertainty and bleak political development make it quite 
onerous to enforce the concept itself.  
 
As part of a recent NOSTRUM project "Needs and Options for Security-Sector 
Transparency and Reform in Ukraine and Moldova" (NOSTRUM, for short), 
supported by Moldovan authorities and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands and implemented jointly by the Centre for European Security Studies 
(CESS) in Netherlands and Institute for Public Policy of Moldova, foreign experts 
came up with a raft of recommendations - steps necessary to undertake on short and 
mid term.  
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What can Moldova do to escape this deadlock? One option is to wait and see how 
events unfold. This strategy would imply assessing regional security after NATO and 
EU enlargement, assessing the impact of Union's 'wider Europe' policy on Moldova's 
strategic orientation towards EU. In the end it would bring new solutions and bolster 
security sector reform in Moldova.  
 
The alternative to waiting supine would be to do things that should be done, 
regardless of Transdnistrian conflict developments. The strategy would also have to 
look at the impact of EU and NATO's extension. The aforesaid recommendations for 
short and mid term refer in particular to:  
 
1. Measures aimed at increasing the transparency of the defence and security 
sector, including legislative monitoring.  
2. Restructuring the organisation of the defence system and non-military 
institutions of the security sector.  
3. Tightening border control (for persons and goods).  
4. On-going monitoring and evaluation of the defence system (recommended by 
NATO), using new opportunities to adequately and consistently allocate 
resources. The resulted data would help military decision-making.  
 
However, all of these remain quite uncertain as long as on the one hand military 
reform policies are drafted and on the other, ideas like total or "partial" 
"demilitarisation" of the "reunited state" are promoted and even provided for in the 
"Kozak plan" and other similar documents drafted by OSCE. As a result, nobody 
knows how a security system should look like in Moldova.  
 
Speaking of transparency, one should remember a recent example when during the 
annual evaluation session of the Ministry of Defence College late last year, the 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, President Vladimir Voronin asked military 
officials to come up with recommendations on reforming the main units of the 
National Army, such as artillery and air force brigades and anti-aircraft defence. Two 
weeks later a press release issued by the Presidency read that propositions of the 
Ministry of Defence on restructuring military units were approved during the 
Supreme Security Council meeting. Once Government endorses them they would be 
submitted for Parliament approval. Restructuring, or as the President put it "… let's 
get rid of old equipment", actually means selling munitions and military equipment 
that our country might no longer need, namely: 6 MiG-29 aircrafts; a few helicopters; 
armoured machines - 209 units (BTR-80, ÒÀB-71, BMP, BMD; cannons - 79; trench 
mortar - 115; installations for general discharge - 12; anti-tank cannons - 36; anti-tank 
guided missiles - 118; anti-tank unguided missiles -113; installations for anti-aircraft 
missiles - 3; installations of anti-aircraft artillery - 23; "Igla", "Strela" mobile 
installations - 66 units. It is known for a fact that some of Moldovan businessmen 
have been contracted in the past by interested parties in Africa, North Korea, Iran, etc. 
That is why such deals should be very transparent so as not to tarnish Republic of 
Moldova's image.  
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Moldova gives up on ghosts? 
Igor Botan, 29 April 2004  
 
 
a) "Good evening"  
 
In his speech delivered eight months ago at the 12 anniversary of the Republic of 
Moldova's independence, President Vladimir Voronin said "today Moldova gives up 
on its illusions and old fears". One could easily guess what illusions was President 
Voronin referring to, especially since the plans to amend the political program of the 
Communist Party providing for building socialism and communism in Moldova based 
on Marxist-Leninist theory, had been already made public at that time. This statement 
together with many others on democratisation, liberalisation of economy, conformity 
with Copenhagen criteria for EU integration, etc, were aimed at showing off ruling 
party's commitment to modernise Moldovan society.  
 
The very same illusions issue popped up last week after Communist moguls together 
with President Voronin himself celebrated 134th anniversary of Vladimir Ilici Lenin. 
As a follow-up, one day later the popular show "Good Evening" broadcast on 
"Moldova 1" was a good opportunity to test the ruling party's commitment to give up 
on illusions. The show looked at the Lenin's personality and debated on whether his 
monuments should be reinstalled in Moldovan communities.  
 
One of the curious facts presented during the show was that in the heydays of the 
soviet regime there were around 4,000 monuments of Lenin throughout Moldova, 
while nowadays there are no more then a dozen of them. Artists and historians invited 
to the show agreed that except for very few samples, those monuments presented no 
artistic value and were rather serving ideological purposes. They were removed or 
destroyed rather chaotically, at times even barbarous, in many cases without the 
consent of local authorities. Those actions were the expression of the collapse of the 
Communist regime. That is why attempts to reinstall the monuments are viewed as 
attempts to restore the collapsed regime. An illustration in this respect is the storm of 
criticism and protests brought by the decision of the Communist-controlled Balti 
Municipal Council to reinstall Lenin's monument.  
 
On the other hand, during the talk-show, the leader of the Communist faction in 
Parliament, Victor Stepaniuc, was in favour of reinstalling the monuments in line with 
Government Resolution no. 121/725 of 17.06.2003 on installing monuments. Under 
the law it is in the competence of local councils to decide on such matters. Afterwards, 
Government is to issue resolutions in this respect based on the projects of monuments' 
location and endorsement from Council for artistic evaluation of the sculptural and 
monumental and decorative artworks of the Ministry of Culture. According to the 
leader of the Communist faction the 4,000 Lenin's monuments were installed 
voluntarily in the soviet times, at the decisions of the local soviets (which were 
probably elected in free and fair elections). And this because, Lenin was one of the 
central political figures of the XXth century. The leader of the Communist faction 
refuted accusations that the Communist regime brought by Lenin was bloody and 
inhuman, rather: 1) all the revolutions have been bloody, including the French one; 2) 
it wasn't Lenin personally who committed crimes against certain categories of people, 
or church for that matter; 3) nations only benefited from the Communist regime that  
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brought them modernization, especially "Moldovans who got out of huts only in the 
18th century".  
 
It's hard to assess what was the audience opinion on the show, however when asked to 
vote by phone whether they were in favour of reinstalling Lenin's monuments, only 
(or as many as!) 25% were in favour of that idea. Therefore, it seems the great 
majority of the viewers had already gave up the illusions of Communism, but not the 
Communist leaders, who came up with the initiative.  
 
 
b) About revolutions, regimes and modernisation  
 
It turns that with the passage of time it's necessary to remind some of the well-known 
facts. Otherwise, one might mistakenly conclude from Stepaniuc's message that a 
superficial comparison of historic events may serve only the purpose of manipulating 
public opinion.  
 
- How should revolutions be compared? Indeed, as the famous revolutionary 
Ernesto Che Gevara was saying "nor revolutions are made without shooting". It is not 
that important to compare the "quantity of blood" shed as a result of bourgeois or 
Communist revolutions, which anyway is not in favour of the latter. What is 
important is that values identified and proclaimed by bourgeois revolutions are still 
alive, in contrast to the Communist ones, which are constantly revised and replaced. 
And here lies the main difference between bourgeois and Communist revolutions.  
 
For instance, the core document of the French revolution "Declaration of Human and 
Citizen's rights" adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on August 26, 1789 - is still 
part of the French Constitution. Moreover, the principles of French Declaration are to 
be found in the constitutions of all democratic states, as well as in pseudo-democratic 
states, including the Republic of Moldova.  
 
In this respect, one might rightly wonder: Which are the Constitutions where Marxist-
Leninist principles are still to be found? They were not fully reflected even in the 
USSR Constitution, their gist being disguised in Article 6 referring to the leading role 
of the Communist Party, placing it somewhere between society and God. While the 
party indeed promoted Lenin's ideas on class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat, 
exclusive role of the working class, nationalisation of property, etc. So far, similar 
provisions on the leading role of communist party are still to be found in the 
Constitutions of China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, countries that slowly are giving 
up (on Communist) "ghosts".  
 
From this perspective, statements like "revolutions are prepared by genius, made by 
fanatics, whereas impostors enjoy their results" better illustrate what revolutions have 
in common; than the mere mention that they are bloody.  
 
- How are regimes compared? It is important also to compare regimes that are 
brought to power by revolutions. It goes without saying that regimes brought by 
bourgeois revolutions committed crime and misdoings. In their turn, Communist 
revolutions had a major role in shaping the policies of the bourgeois regimes, pushing 
them to grant more rights to the working class in order to avoid Communist upheaval.  
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What is important is that bourgeois democratic regimes have at hand viable 
institutions able to bring a crisis situation back to normal, which Communist regimes 
obviously lack. In response, Communist leaders cite ability to mobilize society to 
fulfil some mega tasks, such as defeating fascisms in second World War, as an 
illustration to the regimes' efficiency. Under those circumstances, Moldovan 
authorities regularly condemn fascism horrors, especially at anniversaries. However, 
those who survived totalitarian regimes make little difference at all between fascist 
and communist ones. Therefore, condemning only fascism seems a unilateral act 
unless the horrors of the communist regime are not condemned as well. Especially as 
there are enough evidences to this effect.  
 
Recently a raft of studies has been published both in Russia and Germany showing 
that communism and fascism had much in common. For instance, "My small 
Leniniana" by Russian writer Venedict Erofeev quotes extensively fifth edition of 
Lenin's complete works. It shows the "humanism" of Lenin, the person who came up 
with the idea of concentration camps in the first place, as a tool to implementing 
Bolshevik revolutionary justice. To cite just Lenin's address to the Executive 
Committee of Penza district "We need to employ a merciless mass terror against 
kulaks, clergy… Those who are not trustful shall be taken to concentration camps 
outside the cities. Telegraph about enforcement!"  
 
Two years ago Moscow's "Logos" Publishing House published the works of a famous 
German historian Ernst Nolte, expert on totalitarian regimes and causes of the second 
World War. His book "National Socialism and Bolshevism" points that although there 
are differences between Nazism and bolshevism, there are also quite many 
similarities. For a start, fascism was a reaction to the challenge of Communism. 
Second of all, fascism took over some of the communist tools of achieving its goals, 
i.e. fascist concentration camps were a copy of the soviet GULAG. Another similarity 
between the two regimes is their tendency to expand. This explains among others why 
Nazi Germany and Soviet Union became allies in 1939 and divided Central Europe to 
their own will. Moreover, in 1940 USSR submitted an official application to Berlin 
asking to be included in the tier Rome-Berlin-Tokyo. Stalin wanted to join the three 
so as to expand towards Indian Ocean, in exchange for supporting Germany's 
extension to the West.  
 
In his well-known book "The Rise and Fall of the III Reich" American journalist and 
writer William Shirer, published by the Russian "Voenizdat" in the URSS in 1991, 
analyses documents seized by the allied forces, among others notes by main 
propagandist of the Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels. For instance Goebbles could not 
understand why Hitler refused to form an alliance with USSR. Many still wonder how 
come that Hitler attacked his ally. Some cite psychological factors arguing that "two 
bears in the same lair won't stay for long" and that sooner or later they would have 
ended in a fight. It is believed that Hitler felt more vulnerably and therefore decided to 
hit first so as to take his foe by surprise.  
 
Nowadays there are different opinions on fascism and communism. The former was 
defeated in a "hot" war, taken to justice and forced to pay compensation. In contrast, 
communist degenerated over decades of "cold war" and finally collapsed under its 
own inconsistency. Obviously, superpowers didn't even think of tribunals or 
condemning the horrors of communism, as they were more concerned about saving  
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population from the disastrous repercussions of the regime collapse. But it doesn't 
mean that communism atrocities were forgotten, the subject still raises a lot of debates 
with more and more evidences being found. For instance no more than two years ago 
a mass grave was found in the basement of the Russian Supreme Court of Justice 
during restoration works, all of them victims of NKVD. Also about the same time the 
remains of 225 persons, including 80 children were found in Jovka community, 
Ukraine under the floor of the local monastery. Later on it was found that for a short 
while the monastery was in the use of NKVD. Similar discoveries are regularly made 
throughout former USSR. What is striking about the aforesaid examples is the places 
were bodies were hidden.  
 
- How a modernisation is made? As for the thesis about modernisation of the society 
as a result of communist revolution, it isn't flawless either. Totalitarian regimes 
proved indeed of being capable of breakthrough in science and economy, however 
only for a short while. However, there is evidence contesting that thesis. For instance, 
Koreans having the same secular culture and tradition live in two separate countries, 
under two separate regimes. North Koreans fanatically build an atomic bomb under a 
communist regime, while in starvation. South Koreans invade world markets with 
their hi-tech products while under a "bourgeois" democratic regime.  
 
Rather the success of the communist regime came despite the system and not due to it. 
It is known for a fact that repressions were the major source of cheap labour force. 
The same holds true for science elites, which boost progress and modernisation. After 
adjustments to Lenin's practice to expel intelligentsia from the country, later on 
famous USSR scientists well-known worldwide were imprisoned so as to be isolated 
from society and forced to work on the projects of the regime. And this despite all of 
them were not guilty. The resistance of the 70s and 80s led by the famous physicist 
and dissident is well known. Less known is the fate of Serghei Koroliov, founder of 
the Russian cosmonautics, who served 8 years in GULAG. Nicolai Vavilov, founder 
of genetics, died in prison. The famous physicist Lev Landau was saved from prison 
only by the intervention of academic Piotr Kapita, who worked on defence projects. 
The lives of other academics Iulii Hariton and Iacov Zelidovici were pending on the 
success of the USSR's nuclear project. Anyone who travels on "Tupolev" airplane 
should know that the famous aircraft constructor, Andrei Tupolev, served four years 
in prison on accusations of treasury - providing his sketches to French secret service. 
Later on, together with many other scientists he was rehabilitated and even got three 
medals of Hero of Socialist Labour, among others for defeating fascism.  
 
There is no doubt that Communist leaders in Moldova know far too well all those 
things. Nevertheless, at the 2001 Congress of Communist Parties of the CIS in 
Moscow (whereto they flew probably by "Tupolev" airplane), they took part in the 
rehabilitation of the "good name" of Iosif Stalin. It seems that Communist morale 
allows rehabilitating victims and their executors alike.  
 
 
c) Inducing conditioned reflexes  
 
Their opponents have no illusions when it comes to Communists' sincerity in sharing 
Leninist values. They indicate that the families of the Communist moguls are rightly 
considered among the wealthiest and influential in the country. Previous "democratic"  
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rulings paltry against the incumbent ruling, when it comes to creating material 
comfort as a prerequisite of power.  
 
Nobody doubts that leaders of the Communist Party or those who advise them are the 
best experts on political marketing in the country. On the one hand they publicly state, 
especially to the West, that they gave up such Leninist values as: class struggle, 
dictatorship of the proletariat, nationalisation of property, fundamental role of the 
working class, etc. On the other hand, they largely employ Communist rhetoric and 
symbols especially when it comes to rural areas suffering of poverty. In this respect, 
one may want to look in how far the decisions of the Communist municipal 
authorities in Balti and Lipcani are in line with President's claims that "European 
integration that we have engaged in, is a sign of consolidation of the political forces 
and quell of ambitions and narrow party egoism". If so, the interests of which party 
does the restoration of Lenin monuments serve? So, it is wishful thinking to believe 
that Communist moguls would "give up on ghosts" as long as they bring them 
electoral revenues which later on might be converted into liquidity.  
 
The initiative to reinstall Lenin's monuments might serve the goal of inducing 
"conditioned reflexes" among the absolute majority of poor citizens: Lenin on the 
pedestal - food as cheap as during the soviet times (which was one of their promises 
in elections). For this to happen, simultaneously they are blaming the so-called 
democrats on the grounds that they were the ones to bring the country on the verge of 
poverty (which is partially true). The problem is that almost all the elites that came to 
power since independence fall under "Lenin's grandchildren" category. They were 
educated in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, materialism and "new men - constructor 
of Communism". Undoubtedly, their actions stem from their education. Generally 
speaking, the difference between the previous and incumbent elites resumes to the 
time factor - when they changed the Communist label into a democrat one, or when 
they started talking European integration. What all of them have in common is once 
the came to power all of them became rapacious to turn public property into private 
one, even by means of corruption.  
 
To avoid plenary manifestation of "conditioned reflexes" important things are not told 
or even whispered to the citizens. For instance, Communists prefer to overlook the 
Communist Plenary Session of May 1982, held two years after Communism should 
have been supposedly edified, when the Food Program was adopted in order to 
provide citizens of the country with enough food. And that because, albeit low prices 
shelves were empty in the country of victorious Communism. Moreover, no mention 
of the 1962 Novocerkassk events was made. Back then army, tanks and armoured 
machines were employed to suppress the protest rally of the workers at a local electric 
locomotives plant. Thirty of them got killed only because they dared to protest against 
salary cuts and skyrocketed prices on dairy and meat, as food was nowhere to be 
found (see Pravda of 3.07.91). This is how party that staged a military rebellion to 
seize the power in the name of the working class, dealt with the very same working 
class.  
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The gist of the Communist regime brought by Lenin showed off not only in the first 
years after the revolution, but also when the regime was on verge of collapse - 18 
years ago, during the Cernobil accident on April 26, 1986. Back then data on the 
accident was concealed and thousands of people were let to parade on the May 1 day 
and praise party's achievements. The party left them in high radiation levels with 
nothing but Marxist-Leninist slogans.  
 
The aforesaid refers to sporadic events and may not reconstruct the overall 
atmosphere of terror and fear of that time. That is why citizens should have 
comprehensive data on the regime created by Lenin, to whom monuments are raised 
again. In this respect, many more debates should be held as part of the talk-shows in 
order to fully "give up on ghosts".  
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